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A B S T R A C T
Domestic energy prices in Saudi Arabia are set below international market prices. This, coupled with rapid
economic and population growth, is believed to have contributed to the rapid growth in domestic energy de-
mand and, recently, aﬀected the government budget in the face of low international oil prices. In December
2015, Saudi Arabia announced increases in domestic energy prices. This paper therefore considers the impacts,
focusing on gasoline, by estimating a demand function and using it to estimate the change in social welfare.
Gasoline demand is found to be price inelastic suggesting that it may be diﬃcult for the Saudi government to
limit future growth in gasoline consumption using only increases in the administered price of gasoline. Thus,
limiting future gasoline consumption in the KSA might require improved energy eﬃciency of passenger cars,
increased energy awareness by drivers through education and marketing campaigns, and the provision of al-
ternative transport modes within cities.
Although the announced gasoline price increase is not expected to reduce demand considerably, it can deliver
estimated welfare increases of up to 1.66 billion 2010 US$ (~6.23 billion 2010 Saudi Arabian Riyals), which is
around 0.26% of Saudi gross domestic product.
1. Introduction
The past several decades have seen the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
(KSA) experience a large economic and demographic leap, fuelled by its
sizeable oil revenues. Between 1979 and 2015, the KSA's real GDP in-
creased from around 1.26 trillion 2010 Saudi Arabian Riyals (SAR) to
2.52 trillion (SAMA, 2016), population grew from 9.3 million to 31.5
million (World Bank, 2016), and total primary energy consumption
increased from about 22.5 million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe) to
roughly 200 Mtoe (IEA, 2016). During this period, oil revenues have
allowed the Saudi government to provide electricity, fuel, and water to
its citizens below international market prices. The IEA (2017) estimates
that in 2014, the implicit subsidies for electricity and fossil fuels in the
KSA amounted to over $70 billion. Not surprisingly, rapid economic
and population growth, alongside such low administered energy prices,
contributed to the KSA's tenfold increase in energy consumption over
this period.
According to MEP (2015a), the road transport sector is one of the
largest consumers of energy in the KSA. Rising incomes have allowed
most households to own private vehicles, while economic development
has delivered large cities with extensive road infrastructure and a vast
network of highways that connect the numerous cities scattered across
the KSA. The need for private vehicles to travel is reinforced by the
current lack of public transportation systems within cities. As high-
lighted above, the low administered price of gasoline seems to have also
played a role as the demand for motor gasoline grew from 25 million
barrels in 1979 to 204 million barrels in 2015, an average growth of
about 6% per annum (MEP, 2015a; MEIM, 2016).
In December 2015, the Saudi government announced an increase in
the prices of electricity, fuel, and water, which resulted in the nominal
prices for 91- and 95-octane gasoline increasing from 0.45 and 0.60
SAR per liter to 0.75 and 0.90, respectively (although they still remain
below international market prices). The price increases have been de-
signed to promote greater eﬃciency in the KSA's energy economy and
reduce the rapid growth in domestic oil consumption, which some be-
lieve may possibly have put Saudi Arabia on a trajectory to become a
net oil importer sometime in the 2030s (Lahn and Stevens, 2011).
Nevertheless, according to Krane (2015a) low fuel costs are part of
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the social contract in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. It is
therefore important to understand and quantify the impact of the in-
creased gasoline price on both demand and social welfare in the KSA.
Our analysis follows the approach in Ahmadian et al. (2007) by esti-
mating a gasoline demand function using the structural time series
model (STSM), thus providing estimates of price and income elasticities
and an underlying energy demand trend (UEDT) for gasoline in the
KSA. The preferred econometric estimates for the gasoline demand
function are then used to estimate the change in social welfare that
might arise from increasing the gasoline price (in other words, reducing
the implicit subsidy) in the KSA.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 re-
views the literature related to econometric estimates of gasoline de-
mand and welfare. Section 3 introduces the estimation strategy for the
gasoline demand function, describes the data, and presents the results
of the estimation. Section 4 uses the preferred econometric estimates of
gasoline demand to conduct the welfare analysis. Finally, Section 5
oﬀers a brief summary and concludes.
2. Literature review
2.1. Econometric studies of gasoline demand
A plethora of articles has attempted to model econometrically ga-
soline demand for a wide range of countries and groups of countries.
Therefore, following a brief discussion of some previous surveys and
meta-studies on modelling gasoline demand, econometric studies of
gasoline demand that focused on the KSA are reviewed, followed by a
discussion on the development of the STSM/UEDT approach to mod-
elling energy demand, given this is the approach used in this paper.
A number of surveys of gasoline demand modelling and elasticity
estimates have been conducted by Dahl and her associates. The average
short- and long-run price elasticities were found to be −0.29 and
−1.02, respectively, by Dahl (1986), and −0.24 and −0.80, respec-
tively, by Dahl and Sterner (1991). On the other hand, the average
short- and long-run income elasticities were found to be 0.47 and 1.38,
respectively, by Dahl (1986), and 0.45 and 1.16, respectively, by Dahl
and Sterner (1991). Furthermore, Dahl (2012) found that for static
models only, gasoline price elasticities ranged between −0.11 (for
middle-income economies with low gasoline prices) to−0.33 (for high-
income economies with high gasoline prices). She also found that the
income elasticity had a median size of 0.57 across the surveyed studies.
These surveys therefore suggest that gasoline demand is generally price
inelastic in both the short and long run but more inelastic in the short
run. Within the ranges there exists considerable variation across dif-
ferent countries but Dahl (1986) suggests that the results also vary
because of the diﬀerent models, data series, time horizons, functional
forms, and/or econometric techniques used by researchers, even when
studying the same country.
Meta-analysis (an approach that uses statistical techniques to compare
diﬀerent studies in order to understand how the methods used by the
authors of each study aﬀect its estimates) has been used to consider ga-
soline demand elasticity estimates by a number of researchers. This in-
cludes Espey (1998), who examined both gasoline price and income
elasticity estimates and found that they were sensitive to the inclusion or
exclusion of some measure of vehicle ownership and that gasoline demand
was getting more price elastic and less income elastic over time. Fur-
thermore, Brons et al. (2008) found that the geographic area, study year,
time horizon, and functional form signiﬁcantly aﬀected the gasoline de-
mand price elasticity estimates, concluding overall that the average short-
and long-run price elasticities were −0.34 and −0.84, respectively.
Havranek et al. (2012) built on these two earlier meta-analyses by
considering the same studies used in Brons et al. (2008) and using the
same deﬁnitions of the short and long run used by Espey (1998). In doing
so, Havranek et al. (2012) demonstrated that when controlling for pub-
lication bias (the tendency to suppress negative and insigniﬁcant elasticity
estimates) the estimated short- and long-run gasoline price elasticities of
demand were “approximately half compared to the results of the pre-
viously published meta-analyses” (p. 206). Consequently, after correcting
for publication bias, Havranek et al. (2012) found that the short- and long-
run gasoline price elasticities averaged −0.09 and −0.31, respectively.
Finally, Havranek and Kokes (2015) undertook a meta-analysis of esti-
mated income elasticities using the studies surveyed by Dahl (2012) and,
like Havranek et al. (2012), found that there was publication bias. After
correcting for the bias, they found that the short- and long-run gasoline
income elasticities averaged 0.1 and 0.23, respectively.
The studies above covered a wide range of countries, techniques,
and data periods but the core message is that gasoline demand is price
(and income, to an extent) inelastic in both the short and the long run.
Given the scope of the research being undertaken here, Table 1 focusses
explicitly on previous studies that have econometrically modelled ga-
soline demand in the KSA either speciﬁcally or within a group or panel.
Table 1 shows that in general the estimated elasticities are in line with
the above, suggesting that the short- and long-run price and income
elasticities of gasoline demand in the KSA are inelastic – the estimated
long-run income elasticity by Al-Sahlawi (1997) being the only excep-
tion. In summary, most models of gasoline demand suggest that it is
price and income inelastic, which is equally true for the KSA, whether
individually or as part of a panel. Given this, it is interesting to consider
whether similar results are obtained using the STSM/UEDT approach
used in this paper. The previous literature on this approach is therefore
considered next.
2.2. Discussion of methodological issues
The studies considered above generally used time series or panel
data models in order to estimate the price and income elasticities of
gasoline demand. Furthermore, some of the models incorporated a
measure or proxy to try to capture the impact of improvements in the
energy eﬃciency of the stock of passenger cars over time. An alter-
native approach, particularly useful where there are data constraints, is
to incorporate a UEDT, as suggested by Hunt et al. (2003a, 2003b). The
UEDT captures the inﬂuence of exogenous factors that inﬂuence de-
mand over time such as energy eﬃciency and behaviour changes, and
can be modelled stochastically using Harvey's (1990) STSM (aka the
unobserved components model), which Hunt et al. (2003a, 2003b)
argue provides more realistic estimates of energy demand models.
Subsequently, the STSM/UEDT approach to modelling energy de-
mand relationships has been applied to a number of areas of energy
demand modelling,1 including transportation oil and gasoline demand.2
The only study that we are aware of that has used the STSM/UEDT
approach for Saudi Arabia that is connected to gasoline consumption is
Alkhathlan and Javid (2015), who attempted to analyse the eﬀect of
transport and total oil consumption on the environmental quality of the
KSA.3 Although connected to the research undertaken here, Alkhathlan
1 Such as for: UK aggregate energy demand in diﬀerent sectors with diﬀerent data
frequencies (Hunt et al., 2003a, 2003b; Dimitropoulos et al., 2005); natural gas demand
in Ghana (Ackah, 2014); aggregate energy demand for the whole economy and the re-
sidential sector in South Korea (Sa’ad, 2011); electricity consumption in Pakistan (Javid
and Qayyum, 2014; European natural gas demand Dilaver et al., 2014); and industrial
aggregate energy demand in the OECD countries (Adeyemi and Hunt, 2014).
2 These include studies of: British and Japanese transport oil demand (Hunt and
Ninomiya, 2003c); Iranian gasoline demand (Ahmadian et al., 2007); Indonesian petro-
leum products demand (Sa'ad, 2009); British transport oil demand (Broadstock and Hunt,
2010); South Korean transport energy demand (Sa'ad, 2010); UK gasoline and diesel
demand (Broadstock et al., 2011); Ghanaian gasoline demand (Ackah and Adu, 2014);
Swedish and British gasoline demand (Karimu, 2014); Nigerian petroleum products de-
mand (Abdullahi, 2014; Adagunodo, 2014); and Greek gasoline demand (Broadstock and
Papathanasopoulou, 2015).
3 Using data for the period 1971–2013, Alkhathlan and Javid (2015) use the STSM to
estimate what they refer to as the UEDT for total carbon emissions and carbon emissions
from the domestic transport sector, which is found to be non-linear for both the total and
the transport sector.
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and Javid (2015) do not directly estimate a gasoline demand relation-
ship for the KSA, nor the associated income and price elasticities; thus,
as far as we are aware, the estimation undertaken in this paper is the
ﬁrst attempt to model gasoline demand for the KSA using the STSM/
UEDT approach.
2.3. Previous welfare analyses
Many studies have used a general equilibrium approach to model
the welfare implications of energy subsidy removal. Balke et al. (2015),
for example, found for oil exporting countries the removal of subsidies
to be welfare enhancing in their baseline calculation. However, they
found that the optimal subsidy from the point of view of oil exporters is
not zero. Aune et al. (2016) found that the removal of fuel subsidies in
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has a
negative impact on OPEC consumers, but net welfare in OPEC increases
due to higher proﬁts from oil production. Both of the studies focused on
modelling the welfare implications of price reform in an oil-exporting
bloc, whereas our analysis focuses speciﬁcally on Saudi Arabia and its
announced increase in the price of gasoline.
On the other hand, a number of studies have tackled the question of
energy subsidies and welfare using a partial equilibrium approach.
Ahmadian et al. (2007), for example, estimated a gasoline demand
function using the STSM/UEDT approach with data for the period
1968–2002, which was subsequently used to estimate the change in
social welfare for 2003 and 2004 of a higher gasoline price (a policy
being considered by the Iranian authorities around that time). They
estimated that social welfare would fall if the gasoline price were higher
(ceteris paribus). However, once they also allowed for other variables in
the model to change, their results suggested that social welfare would
increase because the changes in the other variables would more than
compensate for the negative eﬀects of the increased gasoline price. In a
more recent study, Davis (2017) analysed the deadweight loss and
environmental cost of gasoline and diesel subsidies across a large
number of countries for 2010. He found that the total global dead-
weight loss due to transport fuel subsidies was $26 billion annually,
while the external costs were found to be $44 billion. In the case of
Saudi Arabia, Davis (2017) estimated a deadweight loss of $3.5 billion
and external costs of $7.3 billion annually. These monetary estimates
rest on a single price elasticity of −0.6 that was assumed for all
deadweight loss and external cost calculations for all countries.
In this paper, a partial equilibrium approach is used to model the
welfare implications of the increase in the administered price of gaso-
line that occurred in Saudi Arabia on December 29, 2015. Gasoline
demand is ﬁrst modelled using the STSM/UEDT approach. The welfare
implications are then considered using the preferred econometrics
models, accounting for both the deadweight loss and external costs
associated with changes in the gasoline price.
3. Modelling gasoline demand
3.1. Estimation methodology
Per capita gasoline demand in the KSA is modelled as a function of
real per capita income, the real gasoline price, and a UEDT:
=G f P Y UEDT( , , )t t t t (1)
where;
=Gt Per Capita Gasoline demand;
=Yt Real Per Capita Income (based on GDP or non-oil GDP per ca-
pita);
=Pt Real gasoline price;
=UEDTt Underlying Energy Demand Trend.
Eq. (1) is estimated using a dynamic autoregressive distributed lag
speciﬁcation as follows:
= + + + + + + +
+ +
− − − − − −g α g α g γ y γ y γ y θ p θ p θ p
UEDT ε
t t t t t t t t t
t t
1 1 2 2 0 1 1 2 2 0 1 1 2 2
(2)
Where gt , yt, and pt are the natural logarithms of Gt , Yt , and Pt in year t
respectively and εt is a random white noise error term. A two-year lag
was chosen to capture any possible dynamic eﬀects, since it is con-
sidered a reasonable length given the data set being used. The coeﬃ-
cients γ0 and θ0 represent the short-run (impact) elasticities for real per
capita income and the real gasoline price respectively. The long-run
real per capita income and real gasoline price elasticities are given by
=
+ +
− −
Γ γ γ γα α1
o 1 2
1 2
and = + +
− −
Θ θ θ θα α1
o 1 2
1 2
, respectively.
Furthermore, the UEDT is a stochastic trend estimated using the
STSM as follows:
= + +− −μ μ β η η NID σ; ~ (0, )t t t t t η1 1 2 (3)
= +−β β ξ ξ NID σ; ~ (0, )t t t t ξ1 2 (4)
where µt and βt are the level and slope of the UEDT respectively. The
hyper-parameters ηt and ξt are the mutually uncorrelated white noise
disturbances with zero means and variances ση2 and σξ2, respectively.
The disturbance terms ηt and ξt determine the shape of the stochastic
trend component (Harvey and Shephard, 1993). Eqs. (2), (3), and (4)
are estimated by a combination of maximum likelihood and the Kalman
ﬁlter using the software package STAMP 8.30 (Koopman et al., 2007).
Where necessary, irregular or outlier interventions (Irr), level in-
terventions (Lvl), and slope interventions (Slp) are added to the model
to aid the ﬁt and help ensure the model passes an array of diagnostic
tests for the standard residuals and the auxiliary (irregular, level, and
slope) residuals. Moreover, the interventions provide information about
important breaks and structural changes during the estimation period
(Harvey and Koopman, 1992). Therefore the estimation strategy in-
volves initially estimating the general model given by Eqs. (2), (3), and
(4) and then eliminating insigniﬁcant variables and adding interven-
tions but ensuring the model passes an array of diagnostic tests4 until
the preferred parsimonious model is obtained. Furthermore, according
to Dilaver and Hunt (2011), the UEDT in the presence of interventions
is given by:
= + +
+
UEDT μ irregular interventions level interventions
slope interventions
t t
(5)
3.2. Data
This study relies on data for gasoline consumption, gasoline prices,
income, and population in the KSA. The nominal gasoline price series
was constructed by analysing all gasoline-related royal decrees that
were issued in Saudi Arabia since 1979. Each royal decree ﬁxed the
gasoline price at a nominal level until the next one. If a royal decree was
issued in the middle of the year, then the nominal gasoline price for that
year was estimated to be a weighted average of the prices before and
after the royal decree, where the weight depended on the number of
days each price prevailed. In 2007, Saudi Aramco, the state-owned oil
company, began to sell 91-octane gasoline in addition to the already
available 95-octane. The lower octane gasoline entered the market at
SAR 0.45 SAR, which is 25% cheaper than the higher grade.
Consequently, the price of gasoline from 2007 onwards was estimated
to be a weighted sum of the two grades, where the weight depended on
the share of consumption of each type (see Fig. 1). The consumer price
index (CPI) was then used to deﬂate the gasoline prices. Finally, real
GDP and non-oil GDP data were obtained from SAMA (2016), gasoline
4 With 10% normally being the maximum level to reject the null hypothesis for in-
dividual parameter coeﬃcients, interventions, and diagnostic tests.
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consumption data were collected from the MEIM (2016), and popula-
tion from the World Bank (2016). Total population was used in the
analysis instead of only male because women also contribute to the
total demand for driving (and thus gasoline) even though they do not
currently drive in Saudi Arabia.5
The question of what income variable to use, GDP or non-oil GDP, is
important. Given the prominence of the oil sector in the KSA, there is a
positive relationship between real GDP and the international oil price
(Algahtani, 2016). Increases in the oil price generally lead to increases
in real GDP, while decreases in the oil price exert the opposite eﬀect.
Non-oil real GDP is likely to be less sensitive to ﬂuctuations in the oil
price, although even non-oil economic sectors depend on oil revenues
to some extent. If the aim were to model energy demand at the whole
economy level then the argument for using real non-oil GDP would
appear to be relatively strong, an approach taken by Hasanov et al.
(2016) for modelling Azerbaijan aggregate electricity demand. How-
ever, the argument is less strong when considering gasoline consumers.
Therefore, although non-oil GDP may be a better stable measure of
gasoline consumers’ income for the KSA, it is not completely obvious
this is the case at this level; consequently, both measures are considered
for the income variable in the analysis below.
3.3. Estimation results
Following the estimation strategy outlined above, the estimated
equations were reduced to two parsimonious speciﬁcations, one for
when income is based on GDP per capita and the other on non-oil GDP
per capita, as shown in Table 2, which also shows the required inter-
ventions to ensure that the models passed the tests (detailed below). In
particular, both models required an intervention for the year 1990
during which the Gulf War occurred and the oil price spiked.
The estimation period for the two models is 1981–2015 in order to
allow for the two lags discussed in the previous section. Table 2 pre-
sents a number of summary statistics and diagnostics tests. These in-
clude p.e.v. (the prediction error variance), AIC (the Akaike informa-
tion criterion), R2 (the coeﬃcient of determination), and Rd2 (the
coeﬃcient of determination based on diﬀerences). All the normality
tests are based on the Bowman-Shenton test distributed approximately
as χ2
2, while H(h) is the test for heteroscedasticity, distributed approxi-
mately as F(h,h). These are complemented by the Durbin-Watson statistic
(DW), the residual autocorrelation coeﬃcient at lag 1 r(1), distributed
approximately as N(0, 1/T), and Q(p,d), which is the Box-Ljung statistic
based on the ﬁrst p residuals’ autocorrelations and distributed
approximately as χd
2.6 Finally, there is the Predictive Failure test χf
2 for
the last eight years of the estimation period distributed approximately
as χ8
2. Importantly, Table 2 shows that the two preferred models pass all
of these diagnostic tests.
Furthermore, at the time of writing preliminary data from MEIM
(N.D.) suggest that gasoline consumption in the KSA in 2016 grew by
less than 1%, thus disrupting the trend over the last ten years in which
gasoline demand had been growing at more than 6% on average. Using
provisional 2016 GDP and non-oil GDP data from SAMA (2016) and
population growth estimates from CDSI (2010), the preferred models in
Table 2 also forecast gasoline demand growth of less than 1% in 2016.
The closeness of the forecasts with the preliminary actual ﬁgures de-
monstrates the robustness of the income and, more importantly, price
elasticity estimates.
The estimated demand model (or curve) based on real non-oil GDP
per capita as the income driver has limited dynamics, with only the
income variable lagged one year, whereas the estimated demand curve
based on real GDP has greater dynamics given the presence of the
lagged gasoline demand variable. This is discussed further below in the
welfare analysis section. The resulting estimated long-run income and
price elasticities are 0.15 and −0.15, respectively, when real GDP per
capita is used as a measure of income, and 0.61 and −0.09,
Fig. 1. Nominal gasoline prices in Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Aramco (N.D.) and authors' calculations
Table 2
The two preferred econometric models of gasoline demand.
Income based on GDP Income based on non-oil
GDP
Estimated Coeﬃcients
α1 0.3685*** –
α2 – –
γ0 – –
γ1 0.0936*** 0.6149***
γ2 – –
θ0 −0.0975*** −0.0871***
θ1 – –
θ2 – –
Long-Run Elasticity
Estimates
Γ (Income) 0.1482 0.6149
Θ (Price) −0.1544 −0.0871
Hyper-Parameters
Irregular 0.000124631 0.000000000
Level 0.000000000 0.000309639
Slope 0.000001264 0.000009683
Interventions Lvl1983***
Lvl1987***
Irr1989***
Irr1990***
Lvl1983***
Irr1989***
Lvl1990*
Goodness of Fit
p.e.v. 0.0001448 0.0002956
AIC −8.2687 −7.6695
R2 0.997 0.992
Rd2 0.941 0.870
Residual Diagnostics
Std Error 0.012 0.017
Normality 0.22 1.02
H(h) H(8) = 1.04 H(9) = 0.24
r(1) −0.13 0.03
DW 2.20 1.45
Q(p, d) χ4
2 = 4.62 χ4
2 = 6.54
Auxiliary Residuals:
Normality – Irregular 0.85 1.52
Normality – Level 1.32 0.20
Normality – Slope 2.58 0.47
Pred. Failure χf
2 χ8
2 = 9.86 χ8
2 = 3.99
Notes: The *, **, and *** represent signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
5 It was recently announced that women would be allowed to drive in Saudi Arabia
starting June 2018 (Reuters, 2017).
6 Although technically, the Durbin-Watson statistic and the Box-Ljung statistic are
biased for the model using income based on GDP given the lagged dependent variable.
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respectively, when real non-oil GDP per capita is used instead.
Although a considerable diﬀerence arises between the two income
elasticities depending on which measure of GDP is used, the gasoline
price elasticity is consistently small across all models. Therefore, ga-
soline demand in the KSA is generally found to be price inelastic, which
is not dissimilar to the previous KSA estimates discussed in Section 2,
despite the diﬀering methodologies. For the welfare analysis, the esti-
mates of the change in total surplus (i.e., social welfare) rest on the size
of the price elasticity. Therefore, the estimated price elasticity's ro-
bustness translates into robustness for the welfare analysis.
The estimated gasoline UEDTs using both measures of income are
shown in Fig. 2 and exhibit a generally upward sloping trend for the
majority of the estimation period. An upward sloping UEDT implies
that if price and income were held constant, then gasoline consumption
per capita in Saudi Arabia would have increased due to the upward
force exerted on it by this trend. If improvements in the energy eﬃ-
ciency of passenger cars were to outweigh other exogenous factors then
the UEDT would be expected to be generally downward sloping, re-
ﬂecting how increased eﬃciency leads to a decrease in consumption
holding everything else constant (see, for example, the estimated
UEDTs for the majority of OECD countries in Al-Rabbaie and Hunt,
2006). In contrast, the upward sloping UEDTs for gasoline demand in
the KSA suggest that either the energy eﬃciency of passenger cars
decreased over the study period, or that it did increase, but was out-
weighed by behavioural changes that ceteris paribus encouraged
greater gasoline consumption per capita.
4. Welfare analysis
4.1. Methodology for calculating welfare
The welfare analysis revolves around the following thought ex-
periment: Suppose the Saudi government decided on the ﬁrst hour of
January 2015 that the nominal prices for 91- and 95-octane gasoline
would rise from 0.45 and 0.60 SAR per liter to 0.75 and 0.90 respec-
tively. In reality, this price increase occurred on December 29, 2015
and had almost no eﬀect on total gasoline consumption in 2015. Our
analysis, however, looks at what would have happened to gasoline
consumption and annual welfare in the short and long run if the ad-
ministered price increase occurred at the start of 2015 instead. The
calculation of this change in social welfare rests on the demand and
supply curves for gasoline in the KSA, which are considered in more
detail below.
4.1.1. The gasoline demand curve and consumer surplus
Two preferred estimates for the demand curve were presented in the
previous section using the two diﬀerent income variables, which in the
short run, can be expressed as follows:
= ∙ ∙ ∙−
−
−G G P Y etˆ t t t UEDT10.369 0.098 10.094 ˆ t (6A)
= ∙ ∙− −G P Y etˆ t t UEDT0.087 10.615 ˆ t (6B)
where Eq. (6A) has real GDP per capita as the income variable (Y ) while
Eq. (6B) has real non-oil GDP per capita.
As mentioned above, the estimated demand curve based on real
non-oil GDP per capita as the income driver, Eq. (6B), has limited dy-
namics with a contemporaneous real price variable and a one-year
lagged income variable. This suggests that the adjustment by gasoline
consumers to a change in price is completed within a year, whereas the
adjustment to a change in income does not start until the year after the
income changes, but is completed within that year. However, the esti-
mated demand curve based on real GDP per capita as the income driver,
Eq. (6A), has more dynamics with lagged per-capita gasoline demand
present in the preferred model, thus giving a greater distinction be-
tween the short- and long-run price and income elasticities. That said,
given the small size of the estimated coeﬃcient on lagged per capita
gasoline demand, the adjustment is still quick, with almost all the ad-
justment coming through after two years for a real price change and
after three years for an income change.
The long-run demand curves for both preferred models can be ex-
pressed as follows:
= ∙ ∙− ( )G P Y etˆ t t UEDT0.154 0.148 ˆ 1.584t (7A)
= ∙ ∙−G P Y etˆ t t UEDT0.087 0.615 ˆ t (7B)
Eq. (7A) is the preferred long-run model based on real GDP per
capita, whereas Eq. (7B) is the preferred long-run model based on real
non-oil GDP per capita. In the case of the latter, the long-run model is
similar to the short-run model due to its limited dynamics.
To estimate the change in consumer surplus that follows an increase
in the administered price of gasoline, the area underneath the demand
curve between the prices before and after the change are calculated.
Thus, if the administered price changes from Pt to P*t then the change in
consumer surplus in the short run for both models is:
∫∆ = ∙ ∙ ∙ ∙− − −CS G P Y e POPdPt
P
P
t t t
UEDT
t t
*
1
0.369 0.098
1
0.094 ˆ
t
t
t
(8A)
∫∆ = ∙ ∙ ∙− −CS P Y e POPdPt
P
P
t t
UEDT
t t
*
0.087
1
0.615 ˆ
t
t
t
(8B)
where POPt is the total population at time t. In the long run, the change
in consumer surplus is:
∫∆ = ∙ ∙ ∙− ( )CS P Y e POPdPt
P
P
t t
UEDT
t t
*
0.154 0.148 ˆ 1.584
t
t
t
(9A)
∫∆ = ∙ ∙ ∙−CS P Y e POPdPt
P
P
t t
UEDT
t t
*
0.087 0.615 ˆ
t
t
t
(9B)
The welfare analysis assumes that income, average eﬃciency of
passenger cars, and driver behaviour and other factors (all of which are
captured in the UEDT) remain unaﬀected by the price increase. In
mathematical terms, the variables Yt and UEDTt do not depend on the
gasoline price.
4.1.2. The gasoline supply curve and producer surplus
The actual data needed to calibrate a supply curve are not available;
however, it can be constructed by examining the structure of reﬁning in
the KSA. Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in reﬁning throughout the
Fig. 2. Estimated UEDTs for gasoline consumption in Saudi Arabia.
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past several decades in order to meet demand, diversify the economy,
and create job opportunities (MEP, 2015b). However, domestic supply
of gasoline has not always met demand and, between 1971 and 2015,
Saudi Arabia shifted from being a net importer of gasoline to a net
exporter and back again (see Fig. 3). According to the IEA (2016), Saudi
Arabia has consistently exported and imported some gasoline
throughout this period, the existence of seasonality in domestic demand
being one reason.
In 2013, there were seven reﬁneries operating in the KSA (MEP,
2015b; Saudi Aramco, 2015). Four were wholly owned by Saudi
Aramco, while the other three were joint ventures between Saudi
Aramco and diﬀerent international oil companies (see Table 3). In
2014, SATORP, another Saudi Aramco joint venture, came on stream in
the KSA. The following year witnessed YASREF, a ﬁfth joint venture,
deliver its ﬁrst shipment of reﬁned petroleum products. Both SATROP
and YASREF contributed to making reﬁning the fastest growing sector
in the Saudi economy in 2014 (MEP, 2015b). Furthermore, Saudi
Aramco expects to begin commissioning its Jazan Reﬁnery and Term-
inal in 2017. This push to increase domestic reﬁning capacity is part of
Saudi Aramco's broader strategy to expand across the entire hydro-
carbon value chain. It also allows the company, which currently im-
ports gasoline at international market prices but sells them at lower
prices domestically, to cut its import bill (Argaam, 2015; Krane,
2015b).
The reﬁning sector is characterized by indivisibility of capital
(Bhattacharyya, 2011). In other words, increments in the supply of
reﬁned petroleum products occur in discrete steps, as shown in Table 3.
Consider the case of a single reﬁnery with a given capacity. The mar-
ginal cost of supply is assumed constant up to the capacity constraint.
So long as the domestic price is below the long-run marginal cost, there
will be no incentive to invest in further reﬁning capacity. This in turn
gives rise to a vertical domestic supply curve at the capacity constraint.
Because of the existence of low domestic fuel prices in Saudi Arabia,
particularly over the last decade, we assume that the domestic gasoline
supply curve is vertical at the capacity constraint (see Fig. 4). Although
we do not know the ﬁxed marginal cost of reﬁning in the KSA, its exact
value has no impact on the change in producer surplus that we wish to
estimate.
The capacity constraint allows us to express the domestic supply
that is provided in year t, whenever there are imports, as follows:
Fig. 3. Gasoline consumption and production in Saudi Arabia.
Source: MEIM (2016).
Table 3
The production of gasoline in reﬁneries in the KSA in 2015.
Source: Saudi Aramco (2015) and MEP (2015b).
In-Kingdom Reﬁneries Saudi Aramco share of gasoline produced (million barrels) Saudi Aramco Ownership Share (%) Total gasoline produced (million barrels)
100% Saudi Aramco owned
reﬁneries
Jeddah (1976) 3.738 100% 3.738
Yanbu (1979) 10.485 100% 10.485
Riyadh (1981) 11.379 100% 11.379
Ras Tanura (1986) 42.304 100% 42.304
Jazan (under construction) 100%
Sub-Total 67.906 67.906
Saudi Aramco joint ventures
SAMREF (1983) 23.766 50% 47.532
SASREF (1986) 2.255 50% 4.510
Petro Rabigh (1990) 4.566 37.5% 12.176
SATORP (2014) 15.639 62.5% 25.022
YASREF (2015) 14.222 62.5% 22.755
Sub-Total 60.448 111.995
Total 128.354 179.901
Fig. 4. Consumer and producer surplus in Saudi Arabia in 2015. Note: Distances and
areas are illustrative.
Fig. 5. Changes in surplus following the 2015 gasoline price increase. Note: Distances and
areas are illustrative.
T.N. Atalla et al. Energy Policy 114 (2018) 123–133
129
= ∙ −S G POP Mt t t t (10)
where St is the supply of gasoline by domestic producers and Mt the
imports.
To estimate the change in producer surplus that results from the
administered price increase, the area of the following rectangle is cal-
culated:
∆ = ∙ −PS S P P( * )t t t (11)
Because of the position of the domestic supply curve, Saudi Arabia's
status as a net importer of gasoline in 2015, and the not so large in-
crease in price, domestic supply is not aﬀected. Instead, imports fall
fromMt toM *t to ensure that total supply and demand are balanced (see
Fig. 5). For very large increases in price, however, it may be possible for
domestic gasoline demand to fall to the point where imports would no
longer be needed and excess domestic supply could be exported.
However, the administered price increase examined in this paper is not
large enough to make Saudi Arabia a net exporter of gasoline.
According to our GDP-based model, the roughly 60% increase in the
administered price of gasoline would have reduced gasoline demand
from the actual value of 32.4 billion liters in 2015 to 31.0 billion liters
in the short run and 30.2 billion liters in the long run. Our non-oil GDP-
based model predicts that the administered price increase would have
reduced gasoline demand from 32.4 to 31.2 billion liters in both the
short and the long run (since in this model the estimated short- and
long-run price elasticities are the same). Given that the domestic supply
of gasoline in 2015 was around 28.6 billion liters, both models de-
monstrate that the KSA would continue to be a net importer of gasoline
following the administered price increase.
4.1.3. External costs
Increasing the gasoline price leads to a reduction in gasoline de-
mand and the distances travelled by passenger cars. This in turn leads to
an additional welfare gain through reduced air pollution, greenhouse
gas emissions, congestion, and accidents. These external costs have
been measured for over 100 countries, including Saudi Arabia, by Parry
et al. (2014). To measure the total external costs, ECt, avoided by the
announced gasoline price increase, the change in gasoline demand
predicted by the preferred models is multiplied by the total marginal
damages, τ , due to air pollution, emissions, congestion, and accidents,
all measured in 2010 SAR per liter of gasoline, as shown below:
= − ∙ ∙EC G P G P POP τ( ( ) ( *))t t t t t t (12)
4.1.4. The price-gap approach
The welfare analysis is conducted using the standard price-gap ap-
proach (Koplow, 2009), which considers the gap between a good's price
and its opportunity cost, which in the case of gasoline is the interna-
tional market price.7 Domestically produced gasoline is implicitly
subsidized because the domestic price is considerably lower than the
international market price, even if the domestic price is higher than
production costs. This subsidy reﬂects foregone revenues. On the other
hand, the subsidy on imports is explicit since they are purchased at
international market prices then sold at much lower prices domes-
tically, giving rise to what we call the ‘import bill’. Since the subsidy cut
considered only aﬀects the demand for imports, the focus falls on the
welfare gains from reducing this import bill.
4.2. Welfare results
4.2.1. Total surplus and deadweight loss
The change in social welfare (or total surplus) due to the gasoline
price increase comprises the sum of changes that occur to three
components: consumer surplus, producer surplus, and government
spending, which includes the import bill (Just et al., 1982). Importing
gasoline at international market prices and selling it domestically at
lower prices results in a negative impact on Saudi Aramco's net proﬁts.
If the government provides a transfer to Saudi Aramco to cover this
subsidy, then any reduction in the import bill would result in an
equivalent reduction in government spending. Nonetheless, even in the
absence of any government transfers, Saudi Aramco would simply ab-
sorb the losses, which in turn would translate into foregone revenues
for the government. In fact, according to the Saudi Ministry of Economy
and Planning (MEP, 2015b), oil revenues accounted for 89% of total
public revenues in 2014. Therefore, given that Saudi Aramco is state-
owned, any changes to the gasoline import bill translate into changes in
government spending.
The welfare analysis conducted here compares the total surplus in
2015 to the total surplus that would have existed in the economy if
gasoline prices were raised at the start of 2015. Fig. 5 illustrates the
breakdown of the net gain in total surplus into three components. First,
Fig. 5 illustrates that the gasoline price increase would reduce demand,
thereby reducing consumer surplus (shown by the sum of the areas
P PCB*t t and BCDE). Second, it would lead to an increase in producer
surplus (or proﬁts) for domestic gasoline producers, mainly Saudi
Aramco (shown by area P PCB*t t ), highlighting how a relatively large
portion of the lost consumer surplus would be transferred to domestic
gasoline producers. Finally, the original import bill, which was ACDG,
would fall to ABEF , reﬂecting a reduction in government spending.
Part of the reduction in government spending would oﬀset the lost
consumer surplus due to imports (shown by the area BCDE). The re-
maining part of the reduction in government spending (shown by the
area FEDG) reﬂects the net gain in total surplus in the Saudi economy
following the gasoline price increase. Looked at from another per-
spective, this net gain in total surplus reﬂects the deadweight loss that is
eliminated by the gasoline price increase.
Table 4 presents the calculated annual net gain in total surplus using
the two preferred demand models, for both the short and the long run
(holding income and the UEDT constant). This shows that the calcu-
lated net gain is between one and two billion 2010 SAR annually, and
depends strongly on the estimated price elasticity. For the non-oil GDP-
based model, with an estimated short- and long-run price elasticity of
−0.087, the net gain as a result of the price increase is 1.1 billion 2010
SAR. For the GDP-based dynamic model, with estimated short- and
long-run price elasticities of−0.098 and−0.154, respectively, Table 4
shows that the calculated net gain is 1.3 and 1.9 billion 2010 SAR,
respectively.
Table 4
The changes to surplus and government spending following the administered price in-
crease.
GDP-based model Non-oil GDP-based model
short run long run short run long run
Price elasticity −0.098 −0.154 −0.087 −0.087
Change in
consumer
surplus
−7834
(−0.31%)
−7907
(−0.31%)
−7935
(−0.31%)
−7983
(−0.32%)
Change in producer
surplus
+7147
(0.28%)
+7147
(0.28%)
+7147
(0.28%)
+7147
(0.28%)
Change in
government
spending
−2033
(0.08%)
−2639
(0.10%)
−1912
(0.08%)
−1921
(0.08%)
Change in total
surplus
+1346
(0.05%)
+1879
(0.07%)
+1124
(0.04%)
+1085
(0.04%)
Notes: The absolute changes are expressed in million 2010 SAR while the percentage
changes, which are expressed relative to real GDP in 2015, are shown between par-
entheses. The change in total surplus is equal to the change in consumer surplus plus the
change in producer surplus minus the change in government spending.
7 The average ‘free on board’ (FOB) spot price of 95-octane gasoline at Jebel Ali port in
2015 is used as a proxy for the international gasoline price (Platts, 2016).
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4.2.2. External costs
As mentioned previously, increasing the gasoline price leads to a
reduction in gasoline demand and the distances travelled by passenger
cars. This in turn leads to an additional welfare gain through reduced
air pollution, greenhouse gas emissions, congestion, and accidents
(shown by the area HIGF in Fig. 5). Using estimates of these external
costs for Saudi Arabia and the estimated gasoline demand models in
Table 2, the welfare gain delivered by reduced external costs can be
calculated. Table 5 shows these results, revealing that accounting for
both the welfare gain from the reduction in deadweight loss and the
welfare gain from lower external costs results in a total welfare gain of
between 3.6 and 6.2 billion 2010 SAR, which is between 0.14% and
0.26% of Saudi Arabia's real GDP in 2015.
4.2.3. Government revenue uplift
In addition to looking at the impact of the gasoline price increase on
social welfare, it is also useful to examine its impact on Saudi national
revenues. This is especially important given the pressures that have
been exerted on the government budget by low international oil prices.
In 2015, total actual revenues from gasoline sales were 16.2 billion SAR
(calculated by taking the actual gasoline price in 2015 and multiplying
it by actual gasoline demand.) In the hypothetical scenario where the
price increase occurred at the start of 2015, the total revenues from
gasoline sales would have been around 24.3 billion SAR on average
across our models. (This is calculated by taking the new gasoline price,
accounting for the potential switching of consumers between diﬀerent
grades of gasoline, and multiplying it by our estimates of gasoline de-
mand at the new price, which is obtained from our demand curves.)
Therefore, we ﬁnd that the gasoline price increase would have resulted
in a revenue uplift of more than 8 billion SAR, most of which would be
a gain in government revenues.
5. Conclusions and policy implications
The KSA is entering a period of substantial economic and social
change following the government's announcement of a new vision for
the next 15 years; which, according to Alarabiya (2016), involves
“deregulating the energy market to make it more competitive”. The
research undertaken for this paper therefore considers the increase in
the gasoline price announced at the end of 2015. In particular, gasoline
demand functions for the KSA are estimated, which are then used to
calculate the potential welfare eﬀects of the administered price in-
crease.
The estimated GDP-based model suggests that the long-run price
and income elasticities of gasoline demand are −0.15 and 0.15, re-
spectively, while the non-oil GDP-based model points to elasticities of
−0.09 and 0.61, respectively. Although there are diﬀerences in the
income elasticity across models, the gasoline price elasticity is con-
sistently small. Furthermore, both models produce an upward sloping
UEDT for the KSA, suggesting that the energy eﬃciency of the stock of
passenger cars either decreased over the study period or increased but
was outweighed by changes in driver behaviour that ceteris paribus
resulted in greater gasoline consumption per capita.
Therefore, if the Saudi government would like to limit future growth
in gasoline consumption, then the estimated model has two messages
for policymakers. First, even if gasoline prices are raised above those
announced on 29 December 2015, the low estimated price elasticity
suggests that this would not markedly reduce gasoline consumption in
the KSA. An alternative transport mode, particularly within cities,
would be needed to make gasoline demand more elastic to price
changes. However, if gasoline prices are raised considerably higher so
that expenditure on gasoline is a much larger proportion of income,
then it is possible that the price elasticity would increase holding ev-
erything else ﬁxed, and thus any further increases in price would have a
bigger impact on gasoline consumption. Second, the generally upward
sloping UEDT suggests that a key way to limit future gasoline con-
sumption would be to improve the energy eﬃciency of passenger cars
and increase energy awareness by drivers through education and
marketing campaigns.
Focusing on the welfare analysis, we demonstrate that the increase
in administered energy prices in the KSA announced at the end of 2015,
which aﬀected both consumers and producers across a number of sec-
tors, could have a signiﬁcant positive impact on welfare in the KSA. For
just the gasoline price increase, our estimates suggest that there would
be a welfare increase of between 0.14% and 0.26% of real GDP per
annum.
The possible welfare gains are noteworthy, but it is worth con-
sidering that there are even longer-term changes that might occur in
consumer behaviour that are not captured by the estimated long-run
price elasticity. For example, over a number of years an increase in the
gasoline price may encourage consumers to live closer to work, thereby
altering the urban sprawl of cities across the KSA. It could be argued
that the estimated long-run price elasticities (and/or the estimated
UEDT) in our models do not adequately capture such changes.
Therefore, if this were the case, then the estimates of the net gain in
social welfare presented in this paper would be lower bound estimates.
Furthermore, the welfare gains would continue to accumulate over
time, and grow larger in the event that oil prices return to the higher
levels seen in the past.
In summary, the welfare calculations suggest the increase in the
administered price of gasoline announced at the end of 2015 in the KSA
yields an overall increase in social welfare. Although within this con-
sumers lose surplus as result of the price increase, how they perceive
this loss depends on how the government achieves an appropriate
balance between redistributing the additional revenues and using them
to help alleviate budget deﬁcit problems. It should also be noted that in
2015 roughly 52% of government spending was on public employee
salaries and beneﬁts (Argaam, 2016). This suggests that the loss in
consumer surplus due to the administered price increase may be oﬀset
by the gain in government revenues, estimated to be around 8 billion
SAR, which could be redistributed back to consumers.
It could be argued, however, that if international oil prices were to
increase then the Saudi government would reinstate the implicit energy
subsidies by lowering the administered prices. However, given that one
of the Saudi government's many goals is to make the energy sector more
competitive, this would seem very unlikely. As noted by Alarabiya
(2016), it has been stated “that providing subsidies with no clear elig-
ibility criteria is a substantial obstacle to the energy sector's competi-
tiveness” and that “market prices shall, in the long term, stimulate
productivity and competitiveness among utility companies and open
the door to investment and diversiﬁcation of the energy mix in the
Kingdom”. Therefore, energy prices in Saudi Arabia are expected to rise
towards international market prices over the next few years regardless
of whether they increase or decrease (SABQ, 2017).
Future work could focus on quantifying the potential welfare gains
Table 5
The welfare gains from reducing deadweight loss and external costs.
GDP-based model Non-oil GDP-based model
short run long run short run long run
Price elasticity −0.098 −0.154 −0.087 −0.087
Reduction in
deadweight loss
+1346
(0.05%)
+1879
(0.07%)
+1124
(0.04%)
+1085
(0.04%)
Reduction in external
costs
+2784
(0.11%)
+4351
(0.18%)
+2493
(0.10%)
+2493
(0.10%)
Net Welfare Gain +4130
(0.17%)
+6231
(0.26%)
+3617
(0.15%)
+3577
(0.14%)
Notes: The absolute changes are expressed in million 2010 SAR while the percentage
changes, which are expressed relative to real GDP in 2015, are shown between par-
entheses. The net welfare gain is equal to the sum of the reductions in deadweight loss
and external costs.
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from the similar price increases in electricity, fuel, and water. Assuming
that they will also produce similar welfare enhancements, then together
they could yield per annum net welfare increases of up to a few percent
of GDP.
Acknowledgements
Earlier versions of this paper were presented and discussed in 2016
at: i) the Institute of Economics (IdEP) Research Seminar, Università
della Svizzera italiana, Lugano, Switzerland; ii) Seminar in Resource,
Environmental, Energy and Development Economics, Centre for Energy
Policy and Economics (CEPE), Department of Management, Technology
and Economics, ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland; and iii) the 34th
USAEE/IAEE North American Conference, Tulsa, Oklahoma, USA. We
are grateful to all the participants for their comments and suggestions,
in particular to Massimo Filippini and Anastasia Shcherbakova. We are
also grateful for our discussions with Leila Benali at Saudi Aramco and
Mona Chitnis as well as the comments and suggestions of two anon-
ymous referees. Nonetheless, we are of course responsible for all errors
and omissions. Finally, the views expressed in this paper are those of
the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of their aﬃliated
institutions. This research did not receive any speciﬁc grant from
funding agencies in the public, commercial, or not-for-proﬁt sectors.
References
Abdullahi, A.B., 2014. Modeling petroleum product demand in Nigeria using Structural
time series model (STSM) approach. Int. J. Energy Econ. Policy 4 (3), 427.
Ackah, I., 2014. Determinants of natural gas demand in Ghana. OPEC Energy Rev. 38 (3),
272–295.
Ackah, I., Adu, F., 2014. Modelling gasoline demand in Ghana: a structural time series
approach. Int. J. Energy Econ. Policy 4 (1), 76–82.
Adagunodo, M., 2014. An empirical analysis of petroleum products demand in Nigeria: a
random trend approach. Glob. J. Arts Humanit. Social. Sci. 2 (4), 53–71.
Adeyemi, O.I., Hunt, L.C., 2014. Accounting for asymmetric price responses and under-
lying energy demand trends in OECD industrial energy demand. Energy Econ. 45,
435–444.
Ahmadian, M., Chitnis, M., Hunt, L.C., 2007. Gasoline demand, pricing policy and social
welfare in the Islamic Republic of Iran. OPEC Rev. 31, 105–124.
Alarabiya, 2016. Full Text of Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030. Available at 〈https://english.
alarabiya.net/en/perspective/features/2016/04/26/Full-text-of-Saudi-Arabia-s-
Vision-2030.html〉 (accessed 16 May 2016).
Al-Faris, A.F., 1997. Demand for Oil Products in the GCC Countries. Energy Policy 25 (1),
55–61.
Al-Faris, A.F., 1992. Income and price elasticities of gasoline demand in the organization
of Arab petroleum Exporting countries. J. Energy Dev. 17 (2).
Algahtani, G., 2016. The Eﬀect of Oil Price Shocks on Economic Activity in Saudi Arabia:
econometric Approach. Int. J. Bus. Manag. 11 (8).
Al-Rabbaie, A., Hunt, L.C., 2006. OECD energy demand: modelling underlying energy
demand trends using the structural time series model SEEDS114. Surrey Energy
Economics Centre (SEEC), School of Economics, University of Surrey, UK.
Al Yousef, N., 2013. Demand for oil products in OPEC countries: a panel cointegration
analysis. Int. J. Energy Econ. Policy 3 (2), 168.
Alkhathlan, K., Javid, M., 2015. Carbon emissions and oil consumption in Saudi Arabia.
Renew. Sustain. Energy Rev. 48, 105–111.
Al-Sahlawi, M.A., 1988. Gasoline demand: the case of Saudi Arabia. Energy Econ. 10 (4),
271–275.
Al-Sahlawi, M.A., 1997. The Demand for Oil Products in Saudi Arabia. OPEC Review.
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.
Argaam, 2015. Saudi Arabia, UAE said to slash gasoline imports by 2016. Available at
〈http://www.argaam.com/en/article/articledetail/id/380068〉 (accessed 16 May
2016).
Argaam, 2016. A look at the evolution of salaries and allowances items in the Saudi
budget in 15 years. Translated from Arabic. Available at 〈http://www.argaam.com/
ar/article/articledetail/id/446226〉 (accessed 14 December 2016).
Arzaghi, M., Squalli, J., 2015. How price inelastic is demand for gasoline in fuel-sub-
sidizing economies? Energy Econ. 50, 117–124.
Aune, F.R., Grimsrud, K., Lindholt, L., Rosendahl, K.E., Storrøsten, H.B., 2016. Oil con-
sumption subsidy removal in OPEC and other Non-OECD countries: Oil market im-
pacts and welfare eﬀects. Statistics Norway Research Department Discussion Paper,
846.
Balke, N.S., Plante, M., Yücel, M., 2015. Fuel subsidies, the oil market and the world
economy. Energy J. 36.
Bhattacharyya, S.C., Blake, A., 2009. Domestic demand for petroleum products in MENA
countries. Energy Policy 37 (4), 1552–1560.
Bhattacharyya, S.C., 2011. Energy Economics: Concepts, Issues, Markets and Governance.
Springer, London.
Broadstock, D.C., Collins, A., Hunt, L.C., 2011. Transportation oil demand, consumer
preferences and asymmetric prices. J. Econ. Stud. 38 (5), 528–536.
Broadstock, D.C., Hunt, L.C., 2010. Quantifying the impact of exogenous non-economic
factors on UK transport oil demand. Energy Policy 38 (3), 1559–1565.
Broadstock, D.C., Papathanasopoulou, E., 2015. Gasoline Demand in Greece: the im-
portance of shifts in the underlying energy demand trend. Int. J. Sustain. Transp. 9
(4), 310–319.
Brons, M., Nijkamp, P., Pels, E., Rietveld, P., 2008. A meta-analysis of the price elasticity
of gasoline demand. A SUR approach. Energy Econ. 30 (5), 2105–2122.
Chakravorty, U., Fesharaki, F., Zhou, S., 2000. Domestic Demand for Petroleum in OPEC
Countries. OPEC Review. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.
CDSI, 2010. Mid-Year Population Estimates for the Administrative Regions and Provinces
(2010–2025). (Translated from Arabic). Saudi Central Department of Statistics and
Information.
Dahl, C.A., 1986. Gasoline demand survey. Energy J. 7 (1), 67–82.
Dahl, C.A., 2012. Measuring global gasoline and diesel price and income elasticities.
Energy Policy 41, 2–13.
Dahl, C.A., Sterner, T., 1991. Analysing gasoline demand elasticities: a survey. Energy
Econ. 13 (3), 203–210.
Davis, L.W., 2017. The environmental cost of Global fuel subsidies. Energy J. 38. http://
dx.doi.org/10.5547/01956574.38.SI1.ldav. Forthcoming.
Dilaver, O., Dilaver, Z., Hunt, L.C., 2014. What drives natural gas consumption in Europe?
Analysis and projections. J. Nat. Gas. Sci. Eng. 19, 125–136.
Dilaver, Z., Hunt, L.C., 2011. Industrial electricity demand for Turkey: a structural time
series analysis. Energy Econ. 33, 426–436.
Dimitropoulos, J., Hunt, L.C., Judge, G., 2005. Estimating underlying energy demand
trends using UK annual data. Appl. Econ. Lett. 12 (4), 239–244.
Eltony, M.N., 1994. An Econometric study of the demand for gasoline in the Gulf co-
operation Council countries. J. Energy Dev. 19 (2).
Eltony, M.N., 1996. Demand for gasoline in the GCC: an application of pooling and testing
procedures. Energy Econ. 18 (3), 203–209.
Espey, M., 1998. Gasoline demand revisited: an international meta-analysis of elasticities.
Energy Econ. 20 (3), 273–295.
Harvey, A.C., 1990. Forecasting, structural time series models and the Kalman ﬁlter.
Cambridge University Press.
Harvey, A.C., Koopman, S.J., 1992. Diagnostic checking of unobserved-components time
series models. J. Bus. Econ. Stat. 10 (4), 377–389.
Harvey, A.C., Shephard, N., 1993. Structural Time Series Models. In: Maddala, G.S., Rao,
C.R., Vinod, H.D. (Eds.), Handbook of Statistics 11. North Holland, Amsterdam, pp.
261–302.
Hasanov, F.J., Hunt, L.C., Mikayilov, C.I., 2016. Modeling and forecasting electricity
demand in azerbaijan using cointegration techniques. Energies 9 (12), 1045.
Havranek, T., Irsova, Z., Janda, K., 2012. Demand for gasoline is more price-inelastic than
commonly thought. Energy Econ. 34 (1), 201–207.
Havranek, T., Kokes, O., 2015. Income elasticity of gasoline demand: a meta-analysis.
Energy Econ. 47, 77–86.
Hunt, L.C., Judge, G., Ninomiya, Y., 2003a. Modelling underlying energy demand trends
(Chapter 9) In: Hunt, L.C. (Ed.), Energy in Competitive Market: Essays in Honour of
Colin Robinson. Edward Elgar, UK, pp. 140–174.
Hunt, L.C., Judge, G., Ninomiya, Y., 2003b. Underlying trends and seasonality in UK
energy demand: a sectoral analysis. "Energy Econ. 25 (1), 93–118.
Hunt, L.C., Ninomiya, Y., 2003c. Unravelling trends and seasonality: a structural time
series analysis of transport oil demand in the UK and Japan. Energy J. 63–96.
IEA, 2017. Energy Subsidies On-Line Database. International Energy Agency. 〈http://
www.worldenergyoutlook.org/resources/energysubsidies/〉 (accessed 28 February
2017).
IEA, 2016. Extended World Energy Balances, 2016 ed. International Energy Agency,
France.
Javid, M., Qayyum, Abdul, 2014. Electricity consumption-GDP nexus in Pakistan: a
structural time series analysis. Energy 64, 811–817.
Just, R.E., Hueth, D.L., Schmitz, A., 1982. Applied Welfare Economics and Public Policy.
Prentice Hall, USA.
Karimu, A., 2014. Impact of economic and non‐economic factors on gasoline demand: a
varying parameter model for Sweden and the UK. OPEC Energy Rev. 38 (4), 445–468.
Koopman, S.J., Harvey, A.C., Doornik, J.A., Shephard N., 2007. STAMP Version 8
Econometric Software International Timberlake Consultants. London, UK.
Koplow, D., 2009. Measuring energy subsidies using the price-gap approach: What does it
leave out? IISD Trade, Investment and Climate Change Series.
Krane, J., 2015a. Reforming end-user energy prices could rationalize GCC energy de-
mand. Oxf. Inst. Energy Stud. Forum 102, 38–41.
Krane, J., 2015b. A reﬁned approach: saudi Arabia moves beyond crude. Energy Policy
82, 99–104.
Lahn, G., Stevens, P., 2011. Burning Oil to Keep Cool: the Hidden Energy Crisis in Saudi
Arabia. Chatham House.
MEIM, 2016. Reﬁned Products Consumption Statistics. Saudi Ministry of Energy, Industry
and Mineral Resources. Saudi Arabia.
MEIM, N.D. Private Communication.
MEP, 2015a. Data Tables from the Annual Reports. Saudi Ministry of Economy and
Planning, Saudi Arabia.
MEP, 2015b. Saudi Economic Report 2014 (SECOR). Saudi Ministry of Economy and
Planning, Saudi Arabia.
Parry, I.W.H., Heine, D., Lis, E., Li, S., 2014. Getting Energy Prices Right: From Principle
to Practice. International Monetary Fund.
Platts, 2016. Platts Market Data Direct.
Reuters, 2017. Saudi king decrees women be allowed to drive. Available at: 〈https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-women-driving/saudi-king-decrees-women-be-
allowed-to-drive-idUSKCN1C12SB〉 (accessed 3 October 2017).
T.N. Atalla et al. Energy Policy 114 (2018) 123–133
132
Sa'ad, S., 2009. Transportation demand for petroleum products in Indonesia: a time series
analysis. OPEC Energy Rev. 33 (2), 140–154.
Sa'ad, S., 2010. Improved technical eﬃciency and exogenous factors in transportation
demand for energy: an application of structural time series analysis to South Korean
data. Energy 35 (7), 2745–2751.
Sa’ad, S., 2011. Underlying energy demand trends in South Korean and Indonesian ag-
gregate whole economy and residential sectors. Energy Policy 39 (1), 40–46.
SABQ, 2017. Energy Minister: Price Reform Starting From 2017. And Financial Support
for Citizens. (Translated from Arabic). Available at 〈https://sabq.org/VhYgHp〉 (ac-
cessed 20 June 2017).
Saudi Aramco, 2015. Saudi Aramco 2015 Facts and Figures. Saudi Arabia.
Saudi Aramco, N.D. Private Communication.
SAMA, 2016. Yearly Statistics: Annual Statistics. Saudi Arabia.
World Bank, 2016. World Development Indicators. Washington, DC. License: Creative
Commons Attribution CC BY 3.0 IGO. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1596/978-1-
4648–0163-1.
T.N. Atalla et al. Energy Policy 114 (2018) 123–133
133
